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IV 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Matthew Bredlow was charged in the Circuit Court for Harford County with 
attempted first-degree murder, attempted second-degree murder, first-degree assault, 
second-degree assault, malicious destruction of property over $1,000, and failure of a 
driver to remain at the scene of an accident resulting in bodily injury or death. (Case No. 
12-K-14-1845). Mr. Bredlow was tried by a jury presided over by the Honorable 
Yolanda L. Curtin. During trial , Judge Curtin granted Mr. Bredlow's motion for 
judgment of acquittal on the charge of attempted first-degree murder. On February 5, 
2016, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on all remaining counts. On May 10,2016, 
Judge Curtin sentenced Mr. Bredlow to a thirty-year sentence with all but twelve years 
suspended. A timely notice of appeal was filed on May 20, 2016. This appeal follows. 
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QUESTIONS PRESENTED 
I. Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Bredlow's requested 
jury instruction on self-defense where that instruction was fairly generated by 
Bredlow's testimony that he struck and injured Mr. Riley as he (Bredlow) 
attempted to escape Riley 's advancing assault with a tire iron? 
II. Did the trial court err when it denied Mr. Bredlow's motion for judgment of 
acquittal as to attempted second-degree murder when there was insufficient 
evidence for a jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Bred low 
intended to kill Mr. Riley, as opposed to grievously injury him? 
2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On November 18, 20 14, Matthew Bredlow was driving home from Washington, 
D.C., when he noticed a man, later discovered to be Mr. Riley, shouting and gesturing 
aggressively toward him in the adjacent lane to his right. (T5 at 31-3 5)1. According to 
Mr. Bredlow, the encounter-which included commands from Mr. Riley to "pull over"-
continued for at least one mile until Mr. Riley abruptly pulled into a Wendy's parking lot. 
(T5 at 34, 44). Mr. Bredlow, wishing to report Mr. Riley's threatening behavior to the 
authorities, turned into the Wendy's parking lot in order to take a picture of Mr. Riley and 
his license plate. (T5 at 35). As Mr. Bredlow approached Mr. Riley's now-parked car 
from behind, he observed Mr. Riley run to the trunk of his car and pick up what looked to 
be a tire iron. (T5 at 39). Frightened for his well-being, Mr. Bredlow "swerved to the left 
and hit the accelerator to try to get away." (T5 at 40). In doing so, he "accidentally 
sideswiped the rear corner of [Mr. Riley's] vehicle and bumped him." Id. After this 
"horrible miscalculation" and "out of fear for [his] own life," Mr. Bredlow drove out of 
the parking lot and "went back to [his] parents ' house to tell them what had happened." 
(T5 at 40-41). Shortly thereafter, Mr. Bredlow was arrested and charged with, inter alia, 
attempted second-degree murder. 
1 Citations to the trial transcript are as follows: 
• T 1 =first competency hearing, Feb. 2, 2015 
• T2 = second competency hearing, Sep. 18, 2015 
• T3 = pretrial motions hearing, Jan. 27, 2016 
• T" = trial, day one, Feb. 3, 20 16 
• T5 =trial, day two, Feb. 4, 2016 
• T6 = trial, day three, Feb. 5, 2016 
• T7 =sentencing, May 10, 2016 
3 
At trial, Mr. Ri ley 's account of the incident differed greatly from Mr. Bredlow's. 
According to Mr. Riley, he was driving home and talking to his ex-wife on the phone 
when he noticed Mr. Bredlow traveling in the lane to his left. (T4 at 26-27). According 
to Mr. Riley, Mr. Bredlow appeared aggressive and was trying to say something, so Mr. 
Riley rolled down his window. (T4 at 28). At this point, while traveling 40-45 mph, the 
two men exchanged some "nasty words" and Mr. Riley "kind of just laughed" at Mr. 
Bredlow. (T4 at 28, 50). Mr. Riley told the jury that, in response, Mr. Bredlow spit from 
his driver's seat, through his passenger-side window, against 40-45 mph headwinds, 
through Mr. Riley's open window, and onto Mr. Riley' s face. (T4 at 28-29, 50, 52). Mr. 
Riley testified that he hit his brakes "trying to get away from him" and Mr. Bredlow 
followed, "constantly trying to keep next to" him. (T4 at 29). Eventually, Mr. Bredlow 
"got a few cars ahead of' him and Mr. Riley "thought it was over." (T4 at 30). 
Mr. Riley then decided to pull into the Joppatown Shopping Center to pick up 
food from Wendy' s. (T4 at 30-3 1). He parked far from the Wendy's entrance because he 
is "very particular with [his] vehicles" and "[doesn' t] like door dings." (T4 at 36). 
Thereafter, Mr. Riley said he popped his trunk and walked to the back of his car to 
change his shoes. (T4 at 31). At that moment, Mr. Riley "noticed a vehicle proceeding to 
come into the parking lot at a high rate of speed." !d. Mr. Riley believed it was Mr. 
Bredlow and that he "wasn 't going to stop" so he "moved to the side of [his] car, pretty 
much near the gas tank" and that was the last thing he remembered. (T4 at 37). Mr. Riley 
was unsure whether he was hit by Mr. Bredlow' s vehicle or his own after the impact. (T4 
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at 53). Mr. Riley was taken to the hospital where he was treated for non-life threatening 
injuries, including a leg fracture, and released that night. (T4 at 40-43). 
Despite their conflicting testimonies, neither Mr. Riley nor Mr. Bredlow offered 
any explanation for why the initial argument started. When asked if he had "any idea 
what may have caused the aggravation," Mr. Riley responded: "No. I didn 't cut anybody 
off. I was just driving in the slow lane, doing the speed limit, and having a conversation 
with my ex." (T4 at 48-49). Likewise, Mr. Bredlow testified that he was "traveling with 
[a] group of vehicles [when Mr. Riley's] white Nissan Maxima began pulling up directly 
beside" him. (T5 at 3 1-32). This continued "for quite some time" until Mr. Bredlow 
"noticed [Mr. Riley] out of the right comer of[his] eye. He was making a lot of hand 
gestures and he already had his window rolled down." (T5 at 32). 
The State produced four witnesses, each of whom observed varying parts of the 
events after Mr. Riley entered the Wendy's parking lot. (T4 at 3). First, Mr. Wimer 
testified that he was turning into the Wendy' s shopping center when he noticed Mr. 
Bredlow's car behind him on Joppa Farm Road. (T4 at 64-65). Once in the parking lot, 
Mr. Wimer observed Mr. Bredlow pass him on his left hand side and "head[] directly 
towards [Mr. Ri ley's] car." (T4 at 66). Mr. Wimer then observed Mr. Riley take "a step, 
maybe two steps towards his vehicle" before Mr. Bredlow "hit [Mr. Riley's] car at the 
left rear corner panel." (T4 at 67). According to Mr. Wimer, Mr. Riley " leapt into the 
air" shortly before the impact and landed on the hood of Mr. Bredlow's car. (T4 at 68). 
Mr. Riley then "rolled off the hood of the car," "sat up," and "was dazed and he shook his 
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head." (T4 at 68-69). Once Mr. Riley was on the ground, Mr. Bredlow turned left and 
drove out of the parking lot. (T4 at 69-70). 
Next, the jury heard testimony from Mr. Dufour, a contractor who was working on 
the walk-in freezer at Wendy's that day. (T4 at 85). Mr. Dufour testified that he was 
"about to climb inside" his van to get a tool when he "heard tires squealing and . . . a 
smash." (T4 at 85-86). When Mr. Dufour looked up, he saw Mr. Riley "going across the 
hood of [Mr. Bredlow's] car." (T4 at 100-0 1). Then, Mr. Dufour observed Mr. Bredlow 
make "a half aU-tum and [speed] off out of the parking lot." (T4 at 87). 
The jury also heard from Ms. Clark, who testified that she "saw a blue car go 
around a yellow truck and speed up towards and hit a white Nissan." (T4 at 105). 
Afterwards, Mr. Bredlow "just drove right back out onto Route 40" and left the.scene. 
(T4 at 106). When asked if Mr. Bredlow headed straight for Mr. Riley ' s car or if he 
turned towards anything else, Ms. Clark responded: "He was headed straight for the car." 
(T4 at 1 07). Ms. Clark further testified that, before the collision, Mr. Riley "had gotten 
out of his car and gone to his trunk, then back over by his door." (T4 at 109-1 0). 
The final eyewitness was Mr. Rockstroh, who was in the Wendy's drive-through 
when he "heard a large crash," turned his head and "saw [Mr. Riley] on top of a car." (T4 
at 11 1-12). According to Mr. Rockstroh, Mr. Riley was "on the hood of the car, trying to 
hold on" while Mr. Bredlow was "swerving back and forth" "trying to shake [him] off the 
hood." (T4 at 113). After Mr. Riley fell off the hood, Mr. Bredlow "continue[d] out 
through the entrance of the shopping center and turn[ed] right on Pulaski Highway." !d. 
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Mr. Rockstroh testified that he did not see "where [Mr. Riley] had been before the 
collision" or "what led up to the collision." (T4 at 114-1 5). 
Before closing arguments, Mr. Bredlow's attorney moved for a judgment of 
acquittal as to the attempted second-degree murder charge. (T5 at 69). He argued that the 
State had not provided evidence to show Mr. Bredlow intended to ki ll Mr. Riley. Id. 
Specifically, counsel argued there was insufficient evidence to determine whether "he 
intended to strike that person, and that when he did so that his intention ,;.,,as to kill the 
person." Id. Ultimately, the trial court denied the motion. (T5 at 73). 
Thereafter, defense counsel requested that the jury be instructed on the issue of 
self-defense on the basis that Mr. Bredlow "felt threatened by this person reaching into 
the trunk of his car who seemed to be getting a weapon, and that he tried to protect 
himself to get away." (T5 at 74). The State, however, opposed any self-defense 
instructions because Mr. Bredlow "testified it was an accident and not an intentional act." 
Jd. The trial judge, unsure whether the facts of this case "fit[] within the legal 
framework" for self-defense, told defense counsel that she would "need to read a little 
more to wrap [her] head around it." (T5 at 76-78). The court recessed overnight. Jd. 
On the final day of trial, defense counsel withdrew his accompanying request to 
instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of attempted voluntary manslaughter and 
the requisite imperfect self-defense instructions associated with that request- which he 
realized was "not appropriate." (T6 at 4). However, the court did not address counsel's 
prior request for a self-defense instruction on the attempted second-degree murder 
charge. !d. Accordingly, the jury was not instructed on self-defense. (T6 at 17 -19). 
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During deliberation, the jury requested clarification on the following portion of the 
second-degree assault instructions: "That the contact was a result of an intentional or 
reckless act of the defendant and was not accidental." (T6 at 57). The court-not wishing 
to create more confusion- responded with a note reading: "We are unclear of what you 
are asking. Please explain further." (T6 at 58). Three hours later, without responding to 
the court's note, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on all counts. (T6 at 59-61). Mr. 
Bredlow was sentenced to thirty years in prison with all but twelve years suspended. (T7 
at 26). 
8 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY DENYING MATTHEW BREDLOW'S 
REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS ON SELF-DEFENSE, WHICH WAS FAIRLY 
GENERATED BY EVIDENCE THAT MR. BREDLOW STRUCK AND INJURED MR. RILEY 
AS HE (BREDLOW) WAS ATTEMPTING TO ESCAPE RILEY'S ADVANCING ASSAULT 
WITH A TIRE IRON 
It is a universally accepted principle that a person may use force to protect 
themselves from harm under appropriate circumstances, even when their behavior would 
normally constitute a crime. Self-defense is a judicially recognized defense in Maryland, 
meaning it has been created and refined by courts over time. "It is unquestioned that one 
is privileged to use force, even deadly force, in self-defense if legitimately and 
reasonably in fear of suffering death or serious bodily harm." Jacobs v. State, 32 Md. 
App. 509, 511 (1976). This fundamental right is guided by the human instinct of self-
preservation- that is, society recognizes the innate desire to stay alive and to avoid 
bodily harm. Indeed, the Supreme Court pointed out that self-defense law tends to 
gravitate "in the direction of rules consistent with human nature." Brown v. United 
States, 256 U.S. 335, 343 (1921). Thus, society tolerates reasonable criminal behavior 
against another when it is necessary and intended to preserve one' s own safety. 
Generally, to be entitled to a self-defense instruction, an accused has a duty to 
retreat or avoid danger if such means were within his power and consistent with his 
safety. Thornton v. State, 162 Md. App. 719 (2005). In other words, "the accused must 
make all reasonable efforts to retreat before resorting to the use of deadly force." Corbin 
v. State, 94 Md. App. 21, 25 (1992). 
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Assuming this condition has been met, there are four elements required to justify 
assaultive conduct on the basis of self-defense: 
(1) the accused must have had reasonable grounds to believe himself in 
apparent imminent or immediate danger of death or serious bodily harm 
from his assailant or potential assailant; (2) the accused must have in fact 
believed himself in this danger; (3) the accused claiming the right of self-
defense must not have been the aggressor or provoked the conflict; and ( 4) 
the force used must have not been unreasonable and excessive, that is, the 
force must not have been more force than the exigency demanded. 
Roach v. State, 358 Md. 418, 429-30 (2000). As long as there is "some evidence" of 
these four elements, self-defense instructions must be granted upon request. See Dykes v. 
State, 319 Md. 206, 216-17 ( 1990). As the Court of Appeals recognized, " [ s ]ome 
evidence is not strictured by the test of a specific standard. It calls for no more than what 
it says-' some,' as that word is understood in common, everyday usage." Id at 217-18. 
Significantly, "[t]he issue of self-defense can be generated on the uncorroborated 
statements of the defendant." Watkins v. State, 79 Md. App. 136, 139 (1989). 
By the same token, the evidence necessary to generate the issue of self-defense 
may also come from the State. See Evans v. State, 28 Md. App. 640, 665 (1975) (holding 
that the evidence necessary to generate the issue of self-defense "may be, but need not be 
produced by the defendant. It may be found in the State's own evidence"); Dykes, 319 
Md. at 217 ("The source of the evidence is immaterial; it may emanate solely from the 
defendant . ... If there is any evidence relied on by the defendant which, if believed, 
would support his claim that he acted in self-defense, the defendant has met his burden"); 
Street v. State, 26 Md. App. 336, 338-41 (1975) (holding that an instruction should only 
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be given on the subject of self-defense where the evidence, by whomsoever produced, is 
legally sufficient to generate a legitimate jury issue in that regard). 
On appeal, a trial court's decision not to grant a jury instruction is reviewed under 
an abuse of discretion standard. Johnson v. State, 223 Md. App. 128, 138 (2015). The 
appellate court considers "whether the instruction was generated by the evidence, 
whether it was a correct statement of law, and whether it otherwise was fairly covered by 
the instructions actually given." Id. (quotations and citations omitted). Thus, reviewing 
courts reverse on the basis of jury instructions failing to fairly cover the law. Smith v. 
State, 403 Md. 659, 663 (2008). Specifically, if "the instructions are ambiguous, 
misleading or confusing to jurors, those instructions will result in reversal and a remand 
for a new trial." Id. 
Requested jury instructions are required to be given "when the following three-
part test has been met: (1) the instruction is a correct statement of law; (2) the instruction 
is applicable to the facts of the case; and (3) the content of the instruction was not fairly 
covered elsewhere in instructions actually given." Dickey v. State, 404 Md. 187, 197-98 
(2008). Again, "the threshold is low, as a defendant needs only to produce 'some 
evidence' that supports the requested instruction." Bazzle v. State, 426 Md. 541, 551 
(2012). The Court of Appeals has stated that "an abuse of discretion standard [is applied] 
to the court's decision not to give a requested instruction, yet we will not hesitate to 
reverse a conviction if we conclude that 'the defendant's rights were not adequately 
protected."' Carroll v. State, 428 Md. 679, 689 (20 12) (quoting Cost v. State, 41 7 Md. 
360, 369 (2010)). 
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Significantly, the use of deadly force in self-defense cannot automatically be 
equated with a conscious decision to employ deadly force. Ferrell v. State, 304 Md. 679, 
686 (1985). In other words, it is possible for a defendant to kill another in self-defense, 
yet to do so without the intention or expectation that their assailant will be killed. I d. To 
illustrate, a defendant fearing for his life may fire a warning shot at the ground that 
ricochets and kills his assailant; or a defendant may swing a baseball bat in order to 
frighten his assailant and accidentally strike and kill him. In both cases- assuming the 
issue is fairly generated by the evidence- a defendant may claim self-defense or, 
alternatively, that they lacked the specific intent to murder. In this way, "a defendant 
may raise inconsistent defenses" such as self-defense and accident. Roach, 358 Md. at 
432; see also Sims v. State, 319 Md. 540, 550 (1990) (holding that "a defendant is entitled 
to have the jury instructed on any theory of defense that is fairly supported by the 
evidence, even if several theories offered are inconsistent"); Bartram v. State, 33 Md. 
App. 115, 118 (1976) ("To be sure, contradictory defenses are not impermissible in our 
jurisprudence"). 
In Roach, a defendant charged with first-degree murder "testified at trial that the 
shooting was accidental" and thus was barred by the trial court from instructing the jury 
on imperfect self-defense. 358 Md. at 432. The Court of Appeals reversed his conviction 
stating, "[ e ]ven if the defense of accident is inconsistent with self-defense ... a defendant 
may raise inconsistent defenses." !d. 
Similarly, in Sims, a defendant charged with second-degree murder denied any 
involvement in the shooting in addition to arguing that "the shooter, 1) acted in hot-
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blooded response to legally adequate provocation or, 2) was entitled to claim imperfect 
self-defense." 319 Md. at 543. He was thereafter denied instructions on manslaughter. 
Id at 548. The trial judge, finding defendant's testimony to be inconsistent with a theory 
of mitigation, stated, "once he takes the stand and denies it I'm not going to allow him to 
walk both sides of the street." !d. The Court of Appeals disagreed, finding the defendant 
could "simultaneously advance inconsistent theories of defense." Id at 550. 
In the present case, the State opposed defense counsel's requested self-defense 
instructions because "the defendant said this was an accident, that he never intended to 
strike Mr. Riley." (T5 at 74). The State did not believe self-defense was generated 
because there needed "to be some sort of assaultive behavior or intentional act." !d. 
However, it is clear from the record that evidence was presented satisfying all four 
elements required to raise the issue of self-defense in Matthew Bredlow's case. 
First, Mr. Bredlow's testimony suggested he "had reasonable grounds to believe 
himself in apparent imminent or immediate danger of death or serious bodily harm from" 
Mr. Riley. Roach, 358 Md. at 429. Mr. Bredlow testified that as he approached, "Mr. 
Riley ran to the trunk of his vehicle and [] picked up what looked to be a tire iron out of 
the spare tire compartment." (T5 at 39). According to Mr. Bredlow, Mr. Riley was 
"going back and forth from his driver's door to his trunk" and " [h]e looked very angry 
and very, very aggressive." (T5 at 37-38). Mr. Riley himself acknowledged that he had 
popped his trunk and that he had "some" tools within. (T4 at 53). And, two of the state's 
independent witnesses con finned that they saw Mr. Riley at the open trunk of his car 
shortly before the collision. (T4 at 81-82, 109- 1 0). Tire irons and heavy-duty tools-such 
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as those used by steamfitters like Mr. Riley-are capable of being deadly weapons. 
Furthermore, Mr. Bredlow testified that " [Mr. Riley] had threatened [him] several times." 
(T5 at 45). Considering the fact that Mr. Riley was previously "screaming and gesturing 
with his hand" aggressively behind the wheel, it would have been reasonable for Mr. 
Bred low to believe that he was in danger of death or bodily harm when he noticed the tire 
1ron. (T5 at 32-35). 
As to the second element of self-defense, Mr. Bredlow did " in fact believe himself 
[to be] in[] danger." Roach, 358 Md. at 429. Mr. Bredlow testified that he "felt very 
scared" and " thought [Mr. Riley] was going to hit [him] with the tire iron." (T5 at 40). 
Mr. Bredlow unambiguously stated, " [a]s soon as I saw him with the spare tire iron, I 
knew he was going to harm me or possibly damage my vehicle in some way." !d. He 
further testified that he feared for his life and that he "was frightened of [Mr. Riley]." (T5 
at 40, 45). Indeed, when Mr. Bred low "saw [Mr. Riley] getting the tire iron [he] 
panicked for [his] own life and realized [Mr. Riley] was trying to fight [him]." (T5 at 56). 
Mr. Bredlow also satisfied the third element required for self-defense because 
there was evidence suggesting that he was not "the aggressor" and that he did not 
"provoke[] the conflict." Roach, 358 Md. at 429. According to Mr. Bredlow, he wanted 
to get a picture of Mr. Riley and his license plate in order to notify police about the road 
rage incident and he "did not want to confront [Mr. Riley] physically or verbally." (T5 at 
46-48). Furthermore, Mr. Bred low indicated that he "was traveling roughly 10 miles an 
hour" when he approached Mr. Riley and suddenly noticed the tire iron. (T5 at 55-56). 
"By that point," he said, "I was already slowing way down to come to a complete stop." 
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(T5 at 56). In fact, Mr. Bred low stated that "[t]he only time [he] accelerated was when 
[he] was leaving the scene of the accident." (T5 at 53). Hence, Mr. Bredlow's testimony 
that he lawfully entered a parking lot to gather evidence for a police complaint provides 
"some evidence" that he was not the aggressor. 
Mr. Bred low satisfied the final element of the self-defense test because he did not 
use "more force than the exigency demanded." Roach, 358 Md. at 430. Mr. Bredlow 
testified that he deliberately drove away from Mr. Riley to avoid being assaulted by him. 
In doing so, Mr. Bredlow did not intend to employ any force at all. Essentially, Mr. 
Bredlow testified that he made "a horrible miscalculation and accidently struck [Mr. 
Riley]." (T5 at 40). Moreover, Mr. Bred low repeatedly stated that he "did not intend to 
hit Mr. Riley ' s vehicle or him." (T5 at 53). 
Interestingly, because Mr. Bredlow testified he deliberately used force to escape 
but did not mean to use any force to assault, the State argued the evidence did not 
sufficiently generate the issue of self-defense. Specifically, the State contended that 
because Mr. Bredlow claimed the contact with Mr. Riley was accidental (though his 
escape attempt was quite intentional), he could not assert that he used force in self-
defense. (T5 at 74, 76). In the State's view, a claim of self-defense can only be justified 
if the accused engages in "some sort of assaultive behavior or intentional act." (T5 at 7 4 ). 
This line of reasoning is misguided for two reasons. First, it ignores the fact that 
Matthew Bredlow did engage in an intentional act-he intentionally accelerated his car in 
an effort to escape. Second, it contradicts the rationale behind the common law right of 
self-defense. 
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As a matter of good public policy, a defendant who unintentionally injures his 
assailant in an intentional attempt to retreat should be entitled to the same self-defense 
instructions as a defendant who chooses instead to engage in combat and intentionally 
injures his assailant. To hold othen~ise encourages individuals to always use force 
instead of exercis ing the well-established duty to retreat when safe to do so. In other 
words, Mr. Bredlow testified that he was attempting to do exactly what the law 
required- retreat from an oncoming attack-when he struck and injured Mr. Riley. To 
now hold that Mr. Bred low is not able to avail himself of a self-defense claim creates a 
puzzling paradox-imposing both a duty to retreat and simultaneously no protection from 
liability if that mandatory retreat injures the attacker. 
The facts of this case are decidedly unique. Namely, Mr. Bredlow's vehicle 
simultaneously served as a weapon and as a means of escape. There are no other 
circumstances imaginable in which a "weapon" may also be used independently as a 
mode of retreat. In this case, Mr. Riley manifested an intention to harm Mr. Bred low 
with a tire iron, a deadly weapon. Mr. Bred! ow was not armed-in the traditional sense, 
at least-and was confined to his vehicle. In the end, Mr. Riley suffered a fractured bone 
in his leg, two torn ligaments in his knees, and torn cartilage in his shoulder. If Mr. Riley 
had successfully used his tire iron, Mr. Bredlow may arguably have suffered much worse. 
Mr. Bredlow would have been within his rights to directly, and intentionally, employ 
comparable force. However, Mr. Bredlow instead chose to retreat and, in doing so, 
struck Mr. Riley 's car and person. Under the trial court's interpretation of the law, Mr. 
Bred low would have been treated more favorably in terms of jury instruction had he 
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intended to strike Mr. Riley. This is an absurd result and runs counter to society's 
justifications for self-defense. A defendant should not be penalized for choosing to 
employ less force against his assailant than he is entitled to. To the contrary, using the 
least amount of force possible should be encouraged. Accordingly, because Mr. 
Bredlow's common law right to self-defense was not adequately protected, this Court 
should reverse his conviction . 
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II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY DENYING MR. BREDLOW'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT 
OF ACQUITTAL AS TO ATTEMPTED SECOND-DEGREE MURDER BECAUSE THERE 
WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE FOR A JURY TO CONCLUDE BEYOND A 
REASONABLE DOUBT THAT MR. BREDLOW INTENDED TO KILL MR. RILEY 
The State's theory of attempted murder rested upon the unsupported inference that 
"Mr. Bredlow's actions ... manifest that he had an intent to kill" Mr. Riley. (T5 at 71) . 
However, the State's argument did not overcome the equally plausible, if not stronger, 
inferences that Mr. Bredlow acted negligently or merely intended to grievously injure Mr. 
Riley. Therefore, the jury was forced to rely on mere speculation when it discerned Mr. 
Bredlow's intent. 
The Court of Appeals has held "that where an attempted murder is charged, the 
State must show a specific intent to kill-an intent to commit grievous bodily harm will 
not suffice." State v. Earp, 319 Md. 156, 164 (1990) (emphasis added). Indeed, while an 
intent to grievously harm may adequately support a conviction for consummated murder, 
it will not sustain a conviction for attempted murder. Abernathy v. State, 109 Md. App. 
364, 374-75 (1996); see also Austin v. State, 90 Md. App. 254, 268-69 (1992). As this 
Court has said, "our legal analysis [recognizes] that the mens rea for attempted murder is 
natTower than the mens rea for consummated murder." I d. 
Because "intent is subjective and, without the cooperation of the accused, cannot 
be directly and objectively proven, its presence must be shown by established facts which 
permit a proper inference of its existence." State v. Smith, 374 Md. 527, 536 (2003). A 
proper inference "must be . . . based upon a rational connection between the facts 
established and the fact to be inferred." Evans v. State, 28 Md. App. 640, 704 (1975). 
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On the other hand, an inference is " irrational and arbitrary, and hence unconstitutional, 
unless it can at least be said with substantial assurance that the [inferred fact] is more 
likely than not to flow from the proved fact on which it is made to depend." Id. (quoting 
Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 36 (1 969)) (internal quotations omitted). 
An intent to kill may be inferred when "a man voluntarily and willfully does an 
act, the natural and probable consequence of which is to cause another's death." Lindsay 
v. State , 8 Md. App. 100, 105 (1969). Thus, in homicide cases, juries may draw the 
"permitted inference of an intent to kill or of an intent to do grievous bodily hann from 
the directing of a deadly weapon at a vital part of the human anatomy or from some 
similar use of deadly force." Evans v. State, 28 Md. App. 640, 704 (1975). 
As applied, these rules mean that using a knife to stab a victim in the head or chest 
is usually sufficient to show intent to kill, but stabbing a victim "in the leg does not 
necessarily mean that [a defendant] possessed the intent to inflict grievous bodily harm 
such that death would be the likely result." Thornton v. State, 397 Md. 704, 737 (2007). 
Jn Selby v. State, this Court reversed an attempted murder conviction where the accused 
stabbed his robbery victim in the lower back with a large butcher knife. 76 Md. App. 20 1 
(1988). It was found that "appellant' s intent was to do grievous bodily harm," which 
would not support a conviction for attempted murder where the victim survived. Id at 
218. 
In addition to the traditional weapons framework, Maryland's homicide 
jurisprudence occasionally deals with cases that do not entail the use of a deadly weapon 
aimed at a vital body part. In such cases, the courts examine whether there was a "similar 
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use of deadly force" from which to infer murderous intent. Evans, 28 Md. App. at 704. 
Again, the evidence must suggest that death was "the natural and probable consequence" 
of the accused's actions, not merely a possibility. Lindsay, 8 Md. App. at 105. 
Otherwise, the evidence is insufficient to establish intent to kill. 
For instance, in Smallwood v. State , the Court of Appeals held evidence showing 
that an HIV-positive rapist knowingly and willfully exposed three of his victims to the 
deadly virus was insufficient to prove an intent to kill. 343 Md. 97 ( 1996). The court 
reasoned that the State had not presented evidence "from which it can reasonably be 
concluded that death by AIDS is a probable result of Smallwood's actions to the same 
extent that death is the probable result of firing a deadly weapon at a vital part of 
someone' s body." ld. at 106. The question ofwhether a defendant intended to kill 
begins with consideration of "the magnitude of the risk to which the victim is knowingly 
exposed." ld at 105. Indeed, " [b]efore an intent to kill may be inferred based solely upon 
the defendant's exposure of a victim to a risk of death, it must be shown that the victim's 
death would have been a natural and probable result ofthe defendant's conduct." l d. at 
105-06 (emphasis added). 
In a case with facts closely mirroring our own, the Court of Appeals of Virginia 
reversed the attempted murder convictions of a defendant who drove his vehicle through 
two police roadblocks. Haywood v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 562 (1995). The court 
explained: 
[T]he question in this case is not whether [defendant]'s acts might have 
resulted in the murder of the police officers. Rather, the question is whether 
[defendant], while driving his truck, formed the specific intent to use his 
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vehicle as a weapon for the unequivocal purpose of murdering the police 
officers. 
Id at 566. In fin din~ insufficient evidence of intent, the court reasoned that while the 
record "may support an hypothesis that [defendant] acted with malice and intended to run 
over or through anyone or anything that got in his way," the prosecution failed to exclude 
another reasonable inference that would exonerate him. ld at 567. Namely, the 
defendant was in trouble with the law and wanted to avoid apprehension. I d. The court 
emphasized there was no evidence that defendant swerved to "hit the police cars when 
they pulled out of his path or that he turned his truck around in an attempt to hit the 
police cars after passing by them." I d. 
When reviewing a denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal, this Court 
considers ''whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime 
beyond a reasonable doubt." Briggs v. State, 348 Md. 470,475 (1998) (quotations and 
citations omitted). Crucially, the beyond a reasonable doubt standard "is not confined to 
those defendants who are morally blameless. Under our system of criminal justice even a 
thief is entitled to complain that he has been unconstitutionally convicted and imprisoned 
as a burglar." Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 323-24 (1979). However, "review of a 
claim of insufficiency is available only for the reasons given by appellant in his motion 
for judgment of acquittal." Whiting v. State, 160 Md. App. 285, 308 (2004). 
In this case, Mr. Bredlow argued that the State had not met its burden of showing 
that he intended to kill :tv1r. Riley. (T5 at 69-70). Specifically, Mr. Bredlow claimed there 
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was insufficient evidence showing, "even in the light most favorable to the State, that he 
intended to strike [Mr. Riley] , and that when he did so that his intention was to kill [Mr. 
Riley]." (T5 at 69). 
The testimony at trial, in the light most favorable to the State, indicated that Mr. 
Bredlow "seemed aggressive" and that he managed to spit through two separate windows 
against 40-45 mph headwinds onto Mr. Riley's face. (T4 at 28-29). However, the 
evidence did not permit a reasonable conclusion that death was a "probable result of [Mr. 
Bredlow' s] actions to the same extent that death is the probable result of firing a weapon 
at a vital part ofsomeone's body." Smallwood, 343 Md. at 106. Significantly, the crash 
occUlTed in an enclosed Wendy's parking lot. A lthough Mr. Wimer testified that-
judging "by the sound of [his] engine"-Mr. Bred low accelerated before the collision, the 
relative lack of space suggests Mr. Bred low may not have believed he was reaching a 
lethal speed. (T4 at 80). The State's exhibits show that the airbags in Mr. Bredlow's car 
did not activate, further confinning a low speed on impact.2 Additionally, Mr. Riley 
testified that he was unsure whether he was actually hit by Mr. Bredlow's car or by his 
own car after the initial crash. (T4 at 53). This is further corroborated by the ambulance 
report, which states that Mr. Bredlow "rammed [Mr. Riley's] car which in tum struck 
[Mr. Riley] and sent him tumbling." (App. 6). 
2 According to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), "Frontal air bags 
are generally designed to deploy in "moderate to severe" frontal or near-frontal crashes, which 
are defined as crashes that are equivalent to hitting a solid, fixed barrier at 8 to 14 mph or higher. 
(This would be equivalent to striking a parked car of similar size at about 16 to 28 mph or 
higher.)." Air Bag FAQs- Safercar.gov, NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., 
http://www.safercar.gov/Vehicle-Shoppers/Air-Bags/General-FAQ. (last visited Nov. 15, 2016). 
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Accord ing to Ms. Clark, Mr. Bredlow drove in a straight path toward Mr. Riley's 
car. (T4 at 107). Mr. Wimer also testified that Mr. Bredlow drove toward Mr. Riley's car 
and that after the initial impact, Mr. Riley "leapt into the air. I remember him taking that 
jump." (T4 at 68). After Mr. Bredlow's car "rolled left off of' the other car, Mr. Riley 
ended up "on the hood of the car" and eventually the ground. !d. Taken together, this 
evidence, at most, supports an inference that Mr. Bredlow drove into the parking lot 
intending to hi t Mr. Riley 's car. However, it cannot "be said with substantial assurance" 
that Mr. Bredlow intended to kill Mr. Riley. Evans, 28 M.d. App. at 704. The same set of 
facts also support an inference that Mr. Bred low intended to grievously hann Mr. Riley 
or that Mr. Bredlow was grossly negligent in his attempt to get a picture of Mr. Riley. 
Indeed, Mr. Bredlow's jury (fruitlessly) sought clarification on the following portion of 
the assault instructions: "That the contact was a result of an intentional or reckless act of 
the defendant and was not accidental." (T6 at 57). 
Mr. Wimer indicated that " [t]here weren't many vehicles" in the parking lot that 
day and that it was "wide open." (T4 at 66). He also testified that Mr. Riley sat up 
immediately fo llowing the collision. (T4 at 79). Thus, like the defendant in Haywood, 
Mr. Bredlow could have easily circled back and hit Mr. Riley again while he was on the 
ground. Instead, Mr. Bredlow "made a half aU-tum and sped off out of the parking lot." 
(T4 at 87). 
The record indicates that Mr. Riley is an able-bodied, thirty-four year old man 
who did not suffer life-threatening injuries. (T4 at 21). In fact, after the crash, Mr. Riley 
was taken to "the hospital and released that night." (T4 at 43). Moreover, photographs of 
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Mr. Riley taken one day after the accident indicate that he was able to stand unassisted. 
(App. 1-5). Due to the relatively small size of Mr. Bredlow's car, the offensive contact 
was primarily with Mr. Riley's shins. (T4 at 47). Mr. Riley's injuries included a "broken 
left leg, tom PCLs, [and a] torn labrum in [his] shoulder"-hardly the type of injuries one 
would expect from an attempted murder. (T4 at 41 ). 
In sununation, a rational jury could not reasonably infer from the aforementioned 
facts that Mr. Bredlow intended to kill Mr. Riley as opposed to merely causing him 
grievous bodily harm. Because the inchoate charge required a specific intent to kill, the 
trial court committed reversible error when it denied Mr. Bredlow's motion for judgment 
of acquittal. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Bredlow respectfully requests that this Court vacate 
his conviction on the charge of attempted second-degree murder, or, at a minimum, that 
his convictions be reversed and his case remanded for new trial. 
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